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Publications in "Disarmament" research area
David Santoro
David Santoro, a postdoctoral fellow at the Liu Institute, writes about how the international community should react to Iran's position on nuclear weapons. "It has never been clear whether Iran really wants nuclear weapons," writes Santoro. "Tehran is making it clear that it does not wish to work constructively with the international community. There must be consequences." "It is then imperative that Beijing stays the course on fresh sanctions against Tehran," he writes. "More than at any other time in history, major powers are united by common dangers."
19 February 2010
Karthika Sasikumar
A chapter in the volume "Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Crisis Behaviour and the Bomb", edited by Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur.
1 February 2010
Karthika Sasikumar
A chapter in Community, Citizenship and the 'War on Terror':Security and Insecurity, edited by Patricia Noxolo and Jef Huysmans.
25 June 2009
Wade Huntley
North Korea has conducted its second nuclear test. The big question now is whether the world's response will recognize the unique features of this most recent intensification of the crisis, and so effectively answer Pyongyang's latest challenge to global nuclear stability and the embryonic disarmament renaissance.
19 June 2009
CTV Newsnet, Wade Huntley
On CTV Newsnet, Wade Huntley discusses the lack of consensus among the international community after North Korea launched rockets on April 5th 2009.
6 April 2009
CTV Newsnet, Wade Huntley
There is a strong interest in keeping the response to the North Korean rocket launch from breaking off talks that try to stop the country's nuclear program; Prof. Wade Huntley talks to CTV Newsnet.
5 April 2009
Wade Huntley
Over the past two decades, engagement with North Korea by the United States and the rest of the world has waxed and waned. This vacillation is evident even in the past year. The Six-Party Talks process produced both optimistic progress toward disabling Korea's nuclear facilities and, more recently, a return to negotiation stagnation and new North Korean threats to resume nuclear weapons development.
10 February 2009
Wade Huntley
Wade Huntley identifies major steps that may be taken towards nuclear disarmament in 2009.
8 January 2009
Karthika Sasikumar
A chapter in "Inside Nuclear South Asia", edited by Scott D. Sagan.
1 January 2009
Edited by David Krieger and Richard Falk
This book focuses on an even more urgent and "inconvenient truth" than global warming. At the nuclear precipice, humanity's choices are catastrophe or transformation. This book explores the present nuclear predicament, and how to step away from the precipice and assure humanity's future. It examines the intersections between international law and national policies; and between nuclear proliferation, nuclear terrorism and nuclear disarmament. The book offers a way out if policy makers of leading countries can summon the vision and political will to move in a new direction.
14 October 2008
Wade Huntley
On September 6, 2008 the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) agreed to exempt India from its rules barring nuclear dealings with countries, like India, that lack comprehensive international safeguards on their nuclear facilities. Exempting India clears the penultimate obstacle to the implementation of the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement initiated by India and the US in July 2005, reversing India’s decades-long isolation from the world’s civilian nuclear trade regime. Letting India back in from the cold will reshape the global non-proliferation regime fundamentally, though the deepest impacts are years away, and calls into question whether the most powerful NSG member states are still willing to place collective non-proliferation objectives above short-term political advantage or commercial gain. Canada, an NSG member, has emerged as a full supporter of opening the nuclear door to India. This represents a dramatic shift from Canada’s long-standing objections to India’s nuclear weapons development.
30 September 2008
Soushiant Zangenehpour, Wade Huntley
“Iran in the World: The Nuclear Crisis in Context” provides the presentations and discussions from the first conference of the Simons Centre’s program on Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
10 April 2008
Saira Khan
Governments accountable to people for their choices are generally more responsible compared to the dictatorial ones. Thus, democratic states are unlikely to violate their formal commitments. However, a democratic United States has repeatedly violated commitments, making treaties and bilateral commitments less meaningful and the weaker states more insecure in the world. While the US has agreed not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states as part of its Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) commitment, it is the first country in the world to announce its intention to develop and use bunker-busting and earth-penetrating nuclear weapons against states suspected of assisting terrorists and developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) clandestinely and the terrorists. What explains this irresponsible decision of the US? This paper argues that democratic states are likely to break such commitments because they can manipulate or ignore public opinion when they face national security threats. In extraordinary security situations, democracies act like non-democracies because they are often allowed by the Constitution to act without the approval of the people’s representatives in the government. Also, people in the democratic states may be inclined to uproot terrorism with the most effective weapon, like nuclear weapons, at the shortest possible time. A combination of these factors enables the US to break its commitments for the sake of its national security concerns. Unless the US proves that democracies are responsible states in terms of commitments, it is unlikely for democracy to be attractive to many nondemocratic states and smaller states that are anti-US may have more reasons to consider acquiring nuclear weapons. The paper is structured in the following manner: The first section discusses the major attributes of democracies and what makes them responsible actors in world politics. Here, focus is on democracy-peace argument, which has its roots in accountability and rational policy arguments. The second section demonstrates that democracies may not always be responsible actors. The section elucidates that democracies may act responsibly when issues are non-security-related and may be less responsible actors or may not live up to their democratic commitments when security issues are at stake. This also means that democracies may act like dictators in the realm of foreign policies in general and international security policies in particular. It portrays that under extreme security threats, democracies are equally irresponsible as nondemocracies. They turn into irresponsible actors if they have to for protecting their states’ national security concerns. Thus, a linkage between democratic violation of treaty commitments and national security issues is developed. The third section looks at United States as a great democracy which, unfortunately, often acts irresponsibly and breaks treaty commitments if and where necessary. In particular, this section focuses on the United States’ decision to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states, a policy that violates American commitment not to attack non-nuclear states as part of the NPT. The fourth section summarizes the paper, draws policy implications, and provides some policy recommendations.
26 March 2008
Erin Baines
Justice and Reconciliation Project, Special Issue with Quaker Peace and Social Witness - Field Notes, No. 6, February 2008
28 February 2008
Wade Huntley
Current debates over impending developments in military and civilian uses of space raise deeper questions of how the expanding human presence in space over the next century might unfold.
16 November 2007
Wade Huntley
Re “Kim Jong-il’s Last Card” (Op-Ed, Oct. 8)
15 October 2007
Karthika Sasikumar, Wade Huntley
In July 2005, the United States and India announced a bold agreement to restore nuclear co-operation. The deal was immediately controversial, engendering opposition in both countries on national security grounds and from arms control advocates anticipating dire consequences for the non-proliferation regime.
3 October 2007
Karthika Sasikumar
After years of careful diplomacy aimed at establishing its identity as a responsible possessor of nuclear weapons and forging a closer alliance with the US, the nuclear deal between the US and India was announced in 2005. An article on the provisions of this agreement (tightening military bonds after the 9/11 attacks; highlighting of ties between Kashmiri and Islamic militancy by India; containment of China by the US) and its global (a model for other developing countries with growing energy needs; economic growth through ceased electricity shortage and alleviation of global warmth; friendship between the world largest democracies), regional (apart from a little likely vicious circle of Asian arms competition, China seems to have excepted the deal), and domestic implications mentioned by strategic analysts, politicians, and technocrats, highlighting the power of the concept of responsibility (and comparing the policy options available to the Canadian government in responding to this deal (will it be worth to break ranks with the US, to put at risk the partnership in a new strategic alliance in Asia, and loose India as a customer for the CANDU design at a new break in nuclear commerce). In general, it seems that in view of the inevitably of nuclear proliferation in which multilateral mechanism are ineffective, India, a stable, economically dynamic democracy that is increasingly close to the US, does not pose a threat to international peace.
1 October 2007
Wade Huntley
To better appreciate the context of the Bush Administration’s reactions to the collapse of the US-North Korea Agreed Framework , this article examines US responses to the threats North Korea’s nuclear ambitions pose to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the wider array of global nonproliferation efforts that treaty spearheads.
30 June 2007
Michael Byers
Michael Byers analyzes the proliferation security initiative, announced in May 2003
5 June 2007
Wade Huntley
14 November 2006
Wade Huntley
A chapter in the volume "Arms Control after Iraq: Normative and Operational Challenges", edited by Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu and Ramesh Thakur.
1 November 2006
Karthika Sasikumar
A chapter in "US Nuclear Weapons Policy: Confronting Today's Threats", edited by George Bunn and Christopher F. Chyba.
1 October 2006
Wade Huntley
Do North Korea’s missile tests really represent an escalation of its threat to global security? The answer is both yes and no
5 July 2006
Wade Huntley
This chapter first reviews US military planning for space dominance, already well underway in the 1990s, as an aspect of its wider plans for global military dominance
2 March 2006
Karthika Sasikumar, Wade Huntley
In November 2005, the Simons Centre convened a conference in Vancouver to explore the initial impact of the first India-US nuclear agreement of July 2005. Results of that conference were compiled into a volume that also includes two analytical essays by the editors, three background papers and suggestions for further reading.
22 November 2005
Ernie Regehr
Canadian policy has never focused on ballistic missile defence as a credible or even promising response to the threat of nuclear destruction via intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM)
1 December 2003
Lloyd Axworthy
The architecture of arms control and disarmament agreements is under challenge. Direct challenges to existing and pending treaties these days are in fact part of a larger pattern – the undermining of security, environmental, and human rights regimes
4 April 2002
Summary and analysis of the Consultation on the Impact of National Missile Defence on Global Nuclear Policy that was held Feb. 16, 2001
15 February 2001
Andrew Mack
This article examines the potential for several Northeast Asia countries that have the technical expertise to be considered virtual nuclear powers and who could acquire nuclear weapons in a relatively short period of time
3 January 2000
This paper is a follow-on to a companion piece (Working Paper No. 6) that examined the scope,nature and causes of recent conventional arms acquisitions in the Asia Pacific region and identified current or prospective developments about which Canada should be concerned. The current paper explores means of curbing potentially troublesome developments, points to some that might be more useful than others, and suggests the most feasible avenues for Canadian involvement.
1 November 1997
This paper examines the scope, nature and causes of recent conventional arms acquisitions in the Asia Pacific region and identifies current or prospective developments about which Canada should be concerned. Over the last ten years, most Asia Pacific states have improved their ability to patrol, defend and control their own territories and nearby coastal areas. Some states are now starting to acquire weapon systems that would enable them to patrol, defend and possibly control areas further afield. To an extent, the individual arms buildups across the region could be described as sensible examples of modernizing outdated equipment and rounding out unbalanced force postures. However, troubling consequences could result from the general change in the character of military equipment being introduced throughout the region, as well as from the effects of recent procurements on existing disputes and insecurities. The paper is meant to be read in conjunction with a companion piece (Working Paper No 7) that explores means of curbing potentially troublesome developments and suggests the most feasible avenues for Canadian involvement.
1 November 1997
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This paper addresses the issue of the naval arms buildup in the Asia Pacific region and the frequently-expressed fears that it might turn into an all-out arms race. The authors find that although the naval buildup has not yet turned into a full-scale arms race throughout the region, a) there is a genuine naval arms race already occurring between the PRC and Taiwan; b) the historical precursors of an arms race are now in place throughout Northeast Asia; and, c) there is a clear danger of an inter-ASEAN naval arms race. The paper concludes by emphasizing the need to put in place official mechanisms to enhance cooperative maritime security, consisting of a combination of confidence building and risk reduction measures together with multinational naval cooperation leading toward full-scale maritime security regimes.
1 March 1997
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